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This ethnographic study examined how a group of high altitude climbers (N = 6) 
drew on ethnomethodological principles (the documentary method of interpreta-
tion, reflexivity, indexicality, and membership) to interpret their experiences of 
cognitive dissonance during an attempt to scale Mt. Everest. Data were collected 
via participant observation, interviews, and a field diary. Each data source was 
subjected to a content mode of analysis. Results revealed how cognitive disso-
nance reduction is accomplished from within the interaction between a pattern of 
self-justification and self-inconsistencies; how the reflexive nature of cognitive 
dissonance is experienced; how specific features of the setting are inextricably 
linked to the cognitive dissonance experience; and how climbers draw upon a 
shared stock of knowledge in their experiences with cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance has been studied in a variety of contexts. However, there 
is a marked absence of research on this phenomenon within sport and physical 
activity in general, and on high-altitude mountaineering in particular. This is a 
significant omission given the potentially life-threatening environment in which 
high-altitude climbers place themselves. Only a small percentage of people who set 
out to climb Mt. Everest successfully reach the summit. Some reasons for failure 
include high-altitude sickness, extreme weather conditions, injury, fatigue, loss of 
will, and death. According to Athearn (2005), every season the ratio between the 
number of climbers attempting the peak of Mt. Everest and the number of climbers 
who die is approximately one in 30. Operating in such an environment is likely 
Climbers as Ethnomethodologists  337
to generate cognitive dissonance and, therefore, provides an excellent context for 
researchers in sport psychology wishing to study this phenomenon.
The original statement of cognitive dissonance theory by Festinger (1957) 
proposed that cognitions are held in dissonant, consonant, or irrelevant relations. 
The experience of cognitive dissonance, which results from a need for psychologi-
cal consistency, follows a “non-fitting relation among cognitions” (p. 3). When 
cognitions are dissonant (i.e., do not fit together) individuals experience a state 
of psychological discomfort that motivates them to reduce the uncomfortable 
state in a drive-like manner. The reduction in dissonance is usually driven by the 
unpleasantness of a negative emotion (Harmon-Jones, 2000). Given that people 
differ in their ability to tolerate dissonance those with low tolerance tend to show 
more psychological discomfort in the presence of dissonance and display greater 
efforts to reduce dissonance than persons who have high tolerance. People can 
reduce their dissonance in different ways and can also differ in their preferred mode 
of dissonance reduction. For example, some people may stop thinking (i.e., passive 
forgetting or active forgetting), whereas others may make the relations between 
cognitions irrelevant (Hardyck & Kardush, 1968). Festinger suggested that dealing 
with dissonance occurs via the cognition least resistant to change and may manifest 
itself in attitude, belief, value, or behavior maintenance or change.
According to Aronson (1999), attitude-discrepant behavior and the psychologi-
cal discomfort aroused by it are common daily experiences. He described cogni-
tive dissonance theory as being about how people try to “make sense out of their 
environment and their behavior and, thus, try to lead lives that are (at least in their 
own mind) sensible and meaningful” (p. 105). For Thibodeau and Aronson (1992), 
the self-concept is the motivating force underlying cognitive dissonance effects. In 
their view, cognitive dissonance depends on “the specific cognitive elements that 
constitute the individual’s self-concept, as well as the expectations for behavior 
that are derived from these self-relevant cognitions” (p. 592). People experience 
cognitive dissonance when they act in ways that conflict with how they see them-
selves. The resolution of cognitive dissonance involves efforts to maintain or restore 
the threatened elements of the self-concept through justification of the discrepant 
behavior. Aronson suggested that most people have a favorable sense of self that 
they strive to uphold and want to see themselves as competent, moral, and able to 
predict their own behavior. When they act in ways that leave them feeling stupid, 
immoral or confused, they experience cognitive dissonance. Given that people’s 
standards for competence and morality derive from the societies and subcultures 
in which they live, it is possible for people to hold different standards for behavior 
so that certain events are regarded as dissonant for some but not for others. As 
Thibodeau and Aronson stated, “it is the psychological significance of a behavior, 
as it reflects on the self, that carries the potential to arouse dissonance” (p. 594).
In the past, studies into cognitive dissonance have been dominated by quan-
titative methodologies. Some of these studies have explored the content of this 
phenomenon and tried to explain the motivations driving the cognitive changes that 
result when people experience cognitive dissonance (Aronson, 1968, 1992; Cooper, 
1999; Steele, 1988). Other quantitative studies have focused on the precise condi-
tions that mediate cognitive dissonance effects (Aronson & Mills, 1959; Brehm, 
1956). A number of methodological shortcomings have been noted in this research. 
For example, Aronson (1999) suggested there were problems proving cognitive 
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dissonance assumptions and that these issues stemmed from the inability of the 
experimental operations used to test cognitive dissonance effects. Devine, Tauer, 
Barron, Elliot, and Vance (1999) held a similar viewpoint and also suggested that 
outcome measures (i.e., attitude change or bolstering) are limited in what they can 
reveal about the process assumptions of cognitive dissonance theory.
Devine et al. (1999) proposed that researchers move beyond the static, one 
dimensional view produced by conventional quantitative forms of inquiry. They 
encouraged the use of different methodological approaches to explore the process 
dynamics of cognitive dissonance in natural settings as opposed to contrived and 
manipulated environments. In this paper we use an ethnographic approach to exam-
ine the cognitive dissonance experience of a small group of climbers attempting to 
scale Mt. Everest. In choosing this approach, we draw on a recognized and respected 
research tradition within sports related studies (e.g., see Bolin & Granskog, 2003; 
Sands, 2002; Sparkes, Partington, & Brown, 2007; Wheaton, 2004), that has also 
informed a small number of studies in sport psychology (e.g., see Faulkner & 
Sparkes, 1999; Holt & Sparkes, 2001; Krane & Baird, 2005).
Our ethnographic study began with a number of foreshadowed problems relat-
ing to the issue of cognitive dissonance. An important framing device for address-
ing these issues was drawn from the field of ethnomethodology as developed by 
Garfinkel (1967). He was primarily concerned with the everyday social world and 
the ways in which social actors as members of that world accomplish commonplace 
activities via constructions of intersubjective meaning. According to Schwandt 
(1997) this approach involves the study of the everyday practical thinking and the 
processes whereby rules that preside over interactional settings are constructed. 
Schwandt argued that ethnomethodology is a family of approaches “concerned with 
describing and portraying how people construct their own definitions of the social 
situation or, more broadly with the social construction of knowledge” (p. 44). In 
our own study, aspects of these approaches are used primarily as a theoretical lens 
through which to focus on the climbers’ sense-making activities and in particular 
their methods for reducing cognitive dissonance. We are not seeking to conduct an 
‘orthodox’ ethnomethodological study. Rather, we draw on selected ethnomethod-
ological principles and use them as an aid for analyzing the precise ways in which 
social order is constructed and maintained at the microlevel of social interaction 
though specific accounting practices that are both observable, and reportable, for 
the climbers involved.
The use of ethnomethodological principles as a framing device for our ethno-
graphic study of cognitive dissonance experiences in climbers acknowledges the 
complementary relationships between these two approaches. For example, both 
ethnomethodologists and ethnographers share a concern with the ways in which 
social order is actually produced by, and shared between, social actors in natural 
settings. The focus is predominantly on “how” social actors accomplish regular, 
everyday, mundane things, rather than on the “why” or the “what” of these accom-
plishments even though these latter issues are often addressed by ethnographers. 
Both, therefore, are concerned, with describing and analyzing everyday social 
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interaction as it is produced, experienced, and accomplished in the consciousness 
and actions of individuals within a society or subculture.
In contrast, many ethnomethodologists go about their work differently to eth-
nographers. This is evident in Garfinkel’s (1967) most frequently cited work that 
involved a series of “breaching experiments” he devised to uncover how precisely 
people bring a sense of order to their world. In these exercises, his strategy was to 
“produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation, and confusion; to produce the 
socially structured affects of anxiety, shame, guilt, and indignation; and to produce 
disorganized interactions” (p.38). The aim of these exercises was to highlight the 
ways in which, when the social rhythms of daily life (including taken-for-granted 
identities, sensibilities, and interactional routines) are interrupted, people are pro-
pelled actively and consciously to make sense of the situation. They seek feelings 
of common understanding with others, even if the underlying sense or purpose of 
their interaction might be ambiguous, and so are driven to account for the meaning 
or purpose of their “togethering” and interaction.
Ethnographers do not usually seek to produce and sustain bewilderment, 
consternation, and confusion in the groups they study. However, if as Garfinkel 
(1967), argued, we are all practical ethnomethodologists on a daily basis as we go 
about our routine sense-making activities, then ethnographers would be interested 
in how members of a specific group might act according to ethnomethodological 
principles (e.g., the documentary method of interpretation; reflexivity; indexicality; 
and membership), in making sense of the different situations they find themselves 
in over time. Of particular theoretical significance are those situations in which the 
mundane interactional routines that frame an activity are interrupted in ways that 
lead to feelings of confusion and conflict as this leads people to actively redefine 
and make sense of the situation so that order is reestablished.
Situations in sport and performance settings that provoke cognitive dissonance 
for social actors are of particular relevance as they have the potential to oblige 
participants to engage in explicit accounting practices in relation to their deci-
sions and actions. Attempting to climb Mt. Everest is an activity that is conducive 
to generating inconsistent cognitions that characterize the cognitive dissonance 
phenomenon because climbers willingly place themselves in the stressful and 
demanding environment even though it threatens their “instinctive drive” for 
continued life, is bad for their physical health, and requires tremendous levels of 
physical and psychological exertion.
The purpose of our ethnographic study was to examine how the climbers drew 
on the ethnomethodoligical principles of the documentary method of interpretation, 
reflexivity, indexicality, and membership as they sought to reduce the cognitive 
dissonance produced, in some instances, by the potentially deleterious effect upon 
their self-concept of failing to attain the summit of Mt. Everest. We emphasize 
again, this is not an ethnomethodological study of cognitive dissonance but an 
ethnographic study of how climbers operated ethnomethodologically in making 
sense of this experience on the mountain (for other ethnomethodologically informed 
studies see, Allen Collinson & Hockey, 2007; Coates, 1999).
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Method
Ethnography
Ethnography, as defined by Creswell (1998) is an approach where a researcher stud-
ies the meanings of behavior, language, and interactions of a culture sharing group 
to provide a description and interpretation of how, and why, that group act in the 
ways they do. For him, this usually involves prolonged observation of the group, 
“typically through participant observation in which the researcher is immersed in 
the day-to-day lives of the people or through one-on-one interviews with members 
of the group” (p. 58). In a similar fashion Atkinson, Coffey, Delamont, Lofland, and 
Lofland (2001) noted that, to develop a portrait and establish the cultural rules of 
a group, the ethnographic tradition is characterized by a commitment to the “first 
hand experience and exploration of a particular social or cultural setting on the basis 
of (though not exclusively by) participant observation (according to circumstance 
and the analytical purpose of the study)” (p. 4).
According to Jorgensen (1989), “the methodology of participant observation 
is exceptional for studying processes, relationships among people and events, the 
organization of people and events, continuities over time, and patterns, as well as 
the immediate sociocultural contexts in which human existence unfolds” (p. 12). 
For him, participant observation is most appropriate when certain minimal condi-
tions are present. These include the following: The research problem is concerned 
with human meanings and interactions viewed from the insiders’ perspective; the 
phenomenon of investigation is observable within an everyday life setting; the 
researcher is able to gain access to an appropriate setting; the phenomenon is suf-
ficiently limited in size and location to be studied as a case; study questions are 
appropriate for case study; and the research problem can be addressed by qualitative 
data gathered by direct observation and other means pertinent to the field setting. 
Each of these minimal conditions was present in our study of the cognitive dis-
sonance experience of a group of climbers attempting to scale Mt. Everest.
Access and Participants
An average climb to the top of Mt. Everest (8,848 m) takes two months, includ-
ing periods for rest and acclimatization. It requires about ten days of trekking 
through the Solu Khumbu region of the Himalaya Mountain Range to reach Base 
Camp—a protected area at 5,464 m. Once climbers have settled in camp at the 
base of the mountain, they set out on various acclimatization climbs, to allow their 
bodies properly to adjust to the ever-decreasing lack of oxygen in the air, where 
each time they attempt to reach a higher elevation—Camp 1 (6,000 m), Camp 2 
(6,400 m), Camp 3 (7,300 m)—before returning to Base Camp. The final push to 
the summit requires that the climbers wait for a window of opportunity, due to the 
weather, and attempt to climb directly from Base Camp to the summit in a span 
of about three days.
During the spring (March through June) climbing season in 2005, I (Shaunna 
M. Burke), the primary investigator, was part of an Algonquin College Mt. Ever-
est expedition. This provided me with the opportunity to be on the mountain for 
a sustained period of time and to use this site for research purposes. I am also an 
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experienced high-altitude mountaineer and member of the prestigious Mt. Everest 
summit club that is made up of those who have successfully climbed this mountain. 
Therefore, I am skilled in and familiar with the local practices used by the members 
of the climbing subculture under study. Given this background I was identifiable 
to other climbers as one of “them.” Furthermore, as I knew how to act in cultur-
ally appropriate ways on the mountain and given that my behavior, appearance, 
and speech were acceptable to other climbers, I was afforded “insider status.” This 
allowed me to adopt the role of participant observer and granted me access to people, 
sites, and situations that may not have been available to an “outsider.”
At the start of the climbing season on Mt. Everest, I recruited six climbers who 
agreed to participate in my study. The mean age of the participants was 50 years 
(range 39–61 years). Five of the participants were men and one was a woman. Four 
participants identified themselves as North American (Janette, Nate, Allen, Gordie), 
one as British (Steven), and one as Jordanian (Sayeed). All were attempting to 
climb Mt. Everest for the first time but only Nate made it to the summit. Each were 
members of two commercially run expeditions (Expedition 1 and Expedition 2) 
and were amateur rather than professional climbers. They were selected for various 
reasons. For example, five out of the six participants belonged to Expedition 1 and 
their climbing schedule approximated my own as a member of the Algonquin Col-
lege Mt. Everest expedition. This enabled me to adhere to their climbing schedule 
and climb on the mountain at the same time as these participants. Expedition 1 and 
Expedition 2’s Base Camps were ideally located in the same area of the Khumbu 
glacier beside my own Base Camp. All three Camps stood within a 100 m walk of 
one another. This proximity allowed for ease of access to all six participants for 
interview and observation purposes.
Upon the arrival of the Expedition 1 team at Base Camp, I established face-to-
face contact with them, introduced myself and my background, and fully described 
the nature of my inquiry in terms of wishing to understand their experiences of 
attempting to achieve the summit of Mt. Everest. Five out of the 12 Expedition 1 
members expressed interest in taking part. The same procedures were used to gain 
access to the participant from Expedition 2 except the interaction took place on the 
trail to Base Camp. The participants from Expeditions 1 and 2 who showed interest 
were subsequently provided again with the information required regarding their 
involvement and purpose of the study in order that they could make an informed 
decision to participate or not. They signed a consent form explaining that they had 
the option of withdrawing from the study at any point and that confidentiality would 
be respected by omitting any information that may identify them as participants in 
this research and by using pseudonyms in any reports of the study.
Data Collection
During field work, ethnographers can draw on a diverse repertoire of data collection 
techniques (Krane & Baird, 2005). As part of my immersion in the field during 
the climbing season, I was involved in multiple activities with the six participants 
that ranged from climbing on the mountain with them to sharing meals at various 
camps. I was able to spend time with the participants in both formal and informal 
settings, observing their behavior and interactions as well as taking part in events 
unique to the climbing season. This brought me close to the participants and their 
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experiences with cognitive dissonance. Relationships developed, based on a shared 
experience and an understanding of the other involved in the struggles, frustrations, 
and hardships of climbing the mountain. This worked to foster trust and rapport 
as well as enhance my ability to access deeper levels of meaning pertinent to the 
challenges the participants faced on a daily basis. As part of this process, data were 
generated in the form of in-depth interviews captured on videotape and detailed 
observations recorded as field notes.
Formal Interviews. An average of five in-depth interviews was conducted with 
each participant to explore their experiences of attempting to climb Mt. Everest. 
Interviews were undertaken throughout the duration of the expedition, and also one 
month after the participants returned home from the mountain. The interviews, of 
between 45- to 60-min duration, allowed the participants to share their experiences, 
including those relating to cognitive dissonance, and took place at different areas 
on and off the mountain. Questions in the interview guide were generated around 
specific topic areas to reflect both the manifestation and resolution of cognitive dis-
sonance. Examples of topic areas developed to gain insight into how the climbers’ 
cognitive dissonance came about included challenges faced, regrets, frustrations, 
difficult decisions made, and inner conflicts experienced. Topic areas developed to 
explore the ways in which the climbers resolved their cognitive dissonance included 
coping strategies and sense-making practices.
The first interview was conducted a few days after the participants arrived at 
Base Camp. The second interview was held at Camp 2, a day after the climbers 
arrived there and a few days before they set out on their acclimatization climb to 
Camp 3. The third interview took place at Base Camp after the climbers returned 
from their acclimatization climb to Camp 3. The fourth interview took place at 
Base Camp one week before the summit push. The fifth was a telephone interview 
one month after they returned home from Nepal.
During the interviews, my own experiences as a high-altitude climber and my 
feelings about this particular ascent were shared only when it was considered to be 
appropriate and when I was invited to do so. This sharing of experiences helped me 
to develop a more trusting and open relationship with the participants and encour-
aged them to talk more freely about their own experiences. Except for the last inter-
view, which was conducted over the telephone, all of the interviews were captured 
on videotape. The purpose of the videotaped interviews was to help me reconnect 
with the lived reality (e.g., displays of emotion, tiredness) of the participants in 
preparation for, and during, the data analysis process. According to Sands (2002) 
visual images help in recalling an event or witnessing a phenomenon. More than 
bringing to mind what the climbers said, the videotaped interviews served to put 
forward the feeling of the moment while I was working to analyze the transcribed 
interviews. Importantly, video recording can provide more detail of certain kinds 
(i.e., movement, emotion, nonverbal behavior) than does audio recording.
Observations. The observation sessions occurred naturally and took place at Base 
Camp, Camp 2, and at various elevations on the mountain while I climbed with the 
participants. Given that the participants were fully aware that I was making notes 
on any aspect of the climb I felt relevant to my study, then all the observations can 
be classified as overt rather than covert in nature. My observations focused inter 
alia on their cognitive dissonance experience including challenges faced, difficult 
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decisions taken, expectations, regrets, feelings expressed, and interpretations of 
different situations. After each observation session a field diary was used to record 
what was seen and heard. The data collected through observations complemented 
and informed those gained in interviews by providing discussion points regard-
ing events as they occurred in the field. The following extract from my field diary 
illustrates this point.
During my rest day at Camp 2 I had lunch with the climbers from Expedi-
tion 1. As I looked at the group sitting around the dinning table I noticed 
Sayeed sat away from the table somewhat set apart from his team mates. He 
sat slouched over his plate of untouched food and as the group chatted with 
one another about the events of the day and the upcoming climb to Camp 3, 
Sayeed remained quiet. He did not partake in the group discussion and when 
the team leader talked about the need to drink, eat, and rest in order to have 
the required energy to perform on the mountain the next day Sayeed’s head 
lowered and his gaze shifted to the ground. The prospect of continuing the climb 
seemed to be bothering him. His body language was reflecting the comments 
he made in his last interview with me about feeling he might not be able to 
reach his goal of becoming the first Jordanian to stand on the summit. (Field 
Observation, Camp 2).
According to Holt and Sparkes (2001), one of the problems for the ethnographic 
insider studying a culture that they are familiar with is to make the familiar strange 
to maintain analytical distance. Therefore, the field diary was also used critically 
to examine and reflect on my own experiences, including cognitive dissonance, at 
various stages throughout the climb, and the effects I might be having on the set-
ting. This process helped me move back and forth between full involvement with 
the participants and then adopting a position of analytical distance from them, as 
well as also providing me with a resource to challenge my own preconceptions 
of events.
Analysis
The data generated in this study were subjected to a content mode of analysis 
(Sparkes, 2005). This entailed me sifting through the data several times to immerse 
myself in it and understand, interpret, and report the participants’ experiences from 
an empathetic position. The first step involved reading the interview transcripts and 
field diary with a view to identifying where, when, and under what circumstances 
the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance was alluded to in the participants’ expe-
riences. This included situations in which participants became aware of falling 
short of their expectations of being a capable climber, of enduring a great deal of 
physical discomfort without the reward of reaching the summit, of spending large 
amounts of money to endure a great deal of physical discomfort, and placing the 
personal goal of climbing the mountain before their family.
Next, the identification of similarities in the data was undertaken to examine 
the ways in which the participants experienced cognitive dissonance and how this 
related to their sense of self and the situations they found themselves in. Connections 
across the data were explored in an attempt to identify patterns as they emerged 
in the participants’ accounts of their experiences on the mountain. As part of this 
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process, emerging themes and categories were noted. Analytic memos were also 
used as I made preliminary and tentative connections to various ethnomethodologi-
cal processes that I identified the participants using to make sense of their cognitive 
dissonance experience. The four key processes used by them were as follows: the 
documentary method of interpretation, reflexivity, indexicality, and membership. 
These processes operated in an interrelated and over-lapping manner rather than 
as independent and discrete categories of action. Therefore, the data provided to 
illuminate each of these processes in action are necessarily connected and, at times, 
can be interchanged—as is consonant with the ethnomethodological perspective. 
Details of these processes will now be provided in the form of a realist telling as 
described by Sparkes (2002).
According to Sparkes (2002) the realist tale, when well crafted, is useful and 
able to make a significant contribution to our understanding by building knowledge 
about the contours of the social world in a compelling manner. For him, it does so by 
connecting theory to data in a way that “creates spaces for participant voices to be 
heard in a coherent text, and with specific points in mind . . . data-rich realist tales 
can provide compelling, detailed, and complex descriptions of a social world” (p. 
55). Given that ethnographic studies are capable of producing a large mass of rich 
data careful thought needs to be given to what is included as supporting evidence. 
For example, in the Results section that follows where it is indicated that all six of 
the climbers used a specific strategy to deal with cognitive dissonance, space does 
not allow for the presentation of supporting data from all the climbers to support 
this claim. Rather, quotations from interviews with, or field observations of, one 
or two of the climbers are included as illustrative of the kinds of things that the 
climbers said or did. As part of this data selection process not all the climbers are 
represented equally in the Results section. For example, six data segments are used 
from Janette, three from Sayeed, three from Steven, two from Gordie, two from 
Allan, and one from Nate. The contextual nature of ethnographic interpretation also 
means that the data segments from each climber may be located differently within 
the results. For example, of Janette’s six data segments in the results, five appear 
together in the first section as these were linked together around a specific situation 
that confronted her. It was deemed appropriate to cluster these data segments to 
give a sense of the coherence that framed Janette’s perceptions of the situation as 
well as to provide evidence of the ethnomethodological strategy she called upon 
to cope with cognitive dissonance. Such decisions are informed by a desire to 
convey the thoughts, feelings, and experiences of the climbers in their own words 
and actions wherever possible, while recognizing the necessary limiting of space 
that is associated with a journal article of this kind.
Results
Documentary Method of Interpretation
Garfinkel (1967) believed that the way in which people make sense of their world 
was through a psychological process that he called the documentary method of 
interpretation. According to him, people treated “an actual appearance as ‘the 
document of,’ as ‘pointing to,’ as ‘standing on behalf of’ a presupposed underlying 
pattern. Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary 
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evidences, but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted 
on the basis of “‘what is known’ about the underlying pattern” (p. 78). For example, 
people are always seeking to find patterns in their daily lives and actions, and in 
those of others. In a circular process, people are engaged in continuous interpreta-
tion of actions in terms of their contexts (X likes to show off at parties), and the 
contexts themselves are then understood via their relationship to those actions (this 
is a party, so X will probably be showing off). Further, as Coulon (1995) noted, 
“This is what enables us to retrospectively reinterpret some scenes and to modify 
our judgment about things and events” (p. 33).
The documentary method of interpretation was evident in all six of the climb-
ers’ experiences with cognitive dissonance. Reducing cognitive dissonance was a 
pattern of everyday behavior that the climbers experienced when they encountered a 
threat to their self-concept. In this way, self-discrepant or conflicting behaviors and 
thoughts served as standards in the climbers’ experiences with cognitive dissonance 
and acted as guideposts for evaluating the meaning and significance of behavior. 
They also ‘pointed to’ or were the guiding phenomena underlying the pattern of 
self-justification that the climbers used to bring order to their world. This process 
is displayed in the following comment by Janette who, at the end of the climbing 
expedition was in conflict regarding her decision to stay on the mountain, try and 
wait out the weather and hopefully get a chance to attempt climbing to the summit, 
or to go home and be with her children:
What the heck am I doing here? I’ve had it. Mothers should not be climbing 
8,000 meter peaks. It is just so selfish of me. I should go home. I should stay. 
I should go home. I talk to my kids on the phone and I am leaving. I talk to 
someone else and I am staying. (Interview 4, Base Camp).
It was evident that at this point in the expedition Janette was experiencing 
dissonance.
Field notes revealed that Janette did not wish to face the realization that she 
was falling short of her expectations of reaching the summit, but also that she did 
not want to feel guilty any longer about not being at home with her children: “I 
know that I am starting to really struggle but I don’t want to give up now. I won’t 
give up on my dream even though I am fed up feeling guilty about not being around 
for my kids.” (Field observation, Base Camp).
Notes from my field diary also revealed that striving to reach the summit of the 
mountain conflicted with Janette’s self-concept as a “good” mother: “Whenever I 
am in the mountains I think about my children and I feel bad because I am not the 
mother I want to be.” (Field observation, Base Camp). In this instance, her self-
conflicting thoughts characterized her direction of attention and triggered a pattern 
of self-justification. After making the decision to call off the climb and return home 
to be with her children Janette took steps to reduce or eliminate the psychological 
discomfort she was experiencing in a way that allowed her to uphold her preformed 
notion of self as a responsible mother:
I would have been two weeks late and that was not an acceptable option. I 
told my kids that I would be home by June 1st and so I did what I had to do as 
a mom. If I had stayed, my kids would have hated me. What is more impor-
tant, an Everest summit or your kids not trusting you? Had it been any other 
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responsibility I would have blown it off. (Interview 5 by telephone, Home of 
the participant).
Selected events provided self-confirmation regarding Janette’s decision as 
illustrated in the following notes from my field diary.
During the descent from Camp 2 to the base of the mountain I came across 
Janette at the scene of the aftermath of an avalanche that released from the East 
Ridge of the mountain and completely destroyed Camp 1. She stood on the crest 
of a knoll alongside several of her teammates looking out over the multitude 
of tents smashed to smithereens and hurried climbers making rescue attempts 
for the seriously injured. I watched her reaction and took note that she stood 
upright with her arms folded and pressed firmly against her chest. She shifted 
her weight back and forth from one foot to the other in what appeared to be a 
sign of distress. As I approached the group and talked with Janette I noticed a 
stunned and distant look in her eyes. She immediately asked me if she could 
borrow my satellite phone to call home and let her kids know that she was 
okay and not a victim of the avalanche. To that end, I lent her my phone to 
make the call and in returning it she commented that climbing the mountain 
was no longer worth the risk. (Field observation, Camp 1).
The same psychological process drawn on by Janette was used by Sayeed 
who, part way through the expedition, began suffering from stomach aches and 
experienced psychological discomfort in relation to his decision to abandon the 
climb. Failing to match his expectations of reaching the summit threatened his 
self-concept: “You know, sometimes I feel like I am a loser for not doing it.” (Inter-
view 4, Base Camp). This self-conflicting thought propelled Sayeed to engage in 
a process of self-justification that entailed rescuing the threatened element of his 
self-concept:
But in the end I won because I was not feeling well. You can’t beat a mountain 
this size. You can run a marathon if you have stomach problems because you 
know it will only last about 2 or 3 hours, but you can’t beat something like this. 
I believe in God so much and think that whatever happens is meant to happen. 
If you really give your heart to God completely then things will happen for 
you. And I think I did not do that. (Interview 4, Base Camp).
Sayeed’s self-conflicting thought as a “loser” pointed to the presupposed under-
lying pattern that was used to rescue his threatened self-concept and make sense 
of a senseless encounter. He produced a sense of order surrounding his decision 
to abandon the climb by reconfirming his preformed notion of self as capable and 
triumphant. This strategy is consistent with the ethnomethodological view that, when 
they try to make sense of their behavior and the world around them, people search 
for “an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different 
realizations of meaning” (Handel, 1982, p. 57). In this way, a connection is forged 
between the surface document (self-conflicting thoughts) and the underlying pat-
tern of self-justification used to interpret reality and bring order to one’s world as 
commensurate with the documentary method of interpretation.
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Reflexivity
Ethnomethodologists propose that interpretations about society and its workings 
are reflexive. This concept relates to those social practices that implicitly take for 
granted the conditions of their production, so that in the everyday world, people 
rarely have to think actively about the production of their mundane activities, such 
as sense-making. This is done tacitly so that the activity appears automatic and 
natural. Once we define a situation or a person, it/they become in our subjectivity 
the very thing we have defined. For example, if a climber constructs as natural or 
sensible the decision to abandon a climb in relation to taking unnecessary risks 
in a dangerous environment, then those deleterious environmental conditions are 
subsequently constructed as constituting too high a risk due to the fact that any 
‘sensible’ person could be understood to abandon the climb because of them.
For all six of the climbers in this study, the manifestation and resolution of 
cognitive dissonance was a reflexive process. The climbers’ experiences with 
cognitive dissonance simultaneously described and constituted their respective 
realities. To arrive at a certain interpretation or account of a self-discrepant thought 
or situation in a way that appeared to them as normal, natural, and real, all six 
of the climbers engaged in a process that involved reconstructing the past. They 
provided retrospective self-justifications for actions or decisions they had already 
taken to try and help them reduce or eliminate the threats to their self-concept. For 
example, five out of the six climbers made the decision to call off the climb before 
making the final push to the summit and subsequently experienced psychological 
discomfort. The interviews revealed that Steven struggled after making his deci-
sion to turn around:
I keep reliving the moment when I turned back. What if I hadn’t turned around 
and I could have done it? Of course, it does not help that my compatriots did 
make it after I turned back. I keep on reliving that decision. What if I hadn’t, 
could I have made it? The doubt haunts me. (Interview 5, Home of the par-
ticipant).
In a similar way, all of the climbers tried reconstructing the past so that their 
decision no longer conflicted with their self-concept. They reconstructed their 
understanding of events leading to their final decision to convince themselves that 
calling off the climb was guided by the same judgment from the beginning. For 
example, Steven convinced himself, one month after he abandoned the climb, that 
he had made a sensible decision by giving greater emphasis to the declining con-
dition of the icefall, his difficulty with his breathing, his concern that the Sherpas 
were accurate in their belief that the mountain was angry, and the issues that caused 
the dynamic within his team to breakdown. However, these judgments were not 
emphasized before making his decision while he was on the mountain. Notes from 
my field diary revealed that Steven tried reconstructing the past so as to convince 
himself that he made the right decision: “I think I made a sensible decision. In 
these conditions it did not make sense to me. If the conditions had been good and 
you go quickly and come back, and everything works out O.K., that’s fine.” (Field 
observation, Base Camp). This method or process for making sense of his actions 
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not only existed in relation to his prior understanding of the situation but is also 
used to explain and constitute his perception of reality:
I was concerned with going over 8,000 meters with the way my breathing was 
going. I was also concerned with coming back through the icefall because to 
me it was sort of getting a bit too late. There were other problems as well. I had 
mixed feelings about how the Sherpas were feeling because in previous years 
they never came back so late through the icefall and the icefall doctor seemed 
to be a bit nervous about keeping it open so late. So, there were a lot of things 
to weigh up. I have retreated many times on past climbs and I always stop 
when I know that it is not a good idea to continue climbing. And maybe that 
is why I have survived so long because I think you have to have the courage 
to make those decisions. (Interview 5, Home of the participant).
Steven’s method for understanding his decision to call off the climb as sensible 
and courageous simultaneously explains and constitutes his reality. His words 
illuminate how cognitive dissonance is a reflexive process that involves the active 
explaining away of discrepancies to adhere to previously held self-assumptions.
Resolving cognitive dissonance implicitly involves the placing of faith in 
one’s system of self-knowledge or “stock of knowledge at hand,” and subsequently 
reconstructing competing systems into its beliefs with the goal of affirming, 
once-again, the self-assumption. Each time the climbers interpreted some act of 
self-discrepancy, it sharpened the authority of the discrepant act and reestablished 
the boundaries of the self-concept. Furthermore, because the self-concept derives 
from “the conventional morals and prevailing values of society” (Aronson, 1968, p. 
17), and is connected specifically to the subculture to which an individual belongs, 
then interpreting acts as self-discrepant strengthens the norms and reestablishes 
the boundaries of the group. Consequently, the rationality, and authority, of the 
norm is not deemed a topic of inquiry but assumed as a given. It is in this sense 
that reflexivity highlights the self-validating circle involved for the climbers in the 
cognitive dissonance phenomenon.
Indexicality
The concept of indexicality relates to the idea that words and expressions are 
ambiguous, pointing to multiple interpretations and, therefore, require contextual 
information in order for people to understand their meaning. For Garfinkel (1967), 
natural language has no meaning independent of specific context, and the sense of 
an utterance is always local and contingent upon the situation and the biographies 
of those partaking in the conversation. Reality, for him, like language, is constructed 
intra the social environment in which it occurs. Denoting local, time-bound and 
situational aspects of actions, and making sense of the world around them is the 
product of people’s personal biographies and the contingent elements of any given 
situation in which they find themselves.
All the climbers in this study incorporated their personal backgrounds, interac-
tions with others, and the contingent elements of the situation in their experiences 
with cognitive dissonance. For example, the cognitive dissonance that Gordie 
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experienced in relation to his decision to abandon the climb involved a process of 
social comparison:
Having found out later that Jerry and Martin did make it on the 30th I began 
to question my decision. On the one hand I am happy for them, but it also 
makes me more jealous to know that I could have. (Interview 5, Home of the 
participant).
The psychological discomfort that he experienced was intertwined with 
thoughts of his teammates. In Allan’s case, he attributed not reaching the summit 
to the poor weather reports unique to the spring 2005, Mt. Everest season:
If I felt it was a failure on my part then I would have had a tough time with 
it. But all you can do is analyze the data you have at the time and make the 
best decision. Barry, Steven, and I analyzed everything. (Interview 4, Base 
Camp).
The self-justification given by Allan made sense to him based on the informa-
tion made available to him in the moment. All six of the climbers reduced their 
psychological discomfort through a process of contextual (or indexical) interpreta-
tion of a self-discrepant thought or situation. Rather than suggesting that context 
had a cause and effect relationship with how they made sense of their actions, 
the climbers constructed their reality through the setting in which it occurred and 
meaning was handled contextually. The climbers made sense of their behaviors in 
situ denoting a ‘reflexive’ relationship between “singular actions and the relevant 
specifications of identity, place, time, and meaning implicated by the intelligibility 
of those actions” (Lynch & Peyrot, 1992, p. 114).
The sense and meaning not only of indexical expressions like ‘these,’ ‘those,’ or 
‘they,’ but of all expressions and actions is for the most part vague and situationally-
contingent (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). The climbers’ experiences with cognitive 
dissonance in this study support this view point. Without knowing the particulars 
of the culture and environment in which the climbers were performing, the quotes 
given by them are ambiguous. Take, for example, the words of Janette:
I am disappointed in myself. I expected to be so much stronger. But I feel 
completely drained all the time and I struggle with my breathing. I often feel 
like I am drowning. I have always been strong in the past so I am not used to 
feeling this way. (Interview 2, Camp 2).
A person who is not familiar with the activity of high altitude mountaineering 
may be at a loss to comprehend the meaning of this expression. Conversely, however, 
high altitude climbers (who know what it feels like to perform in an environment 
with a lack of oxygen) would have no trouble knowing exactly what Janette is talking 
about. In this manner, the reasoning and language used by the climbers in relation 
to their experiences with cognitive dissonance are indexical in the sense of being 
meaningfully rooted in a lived local context. Their experiences with cognitive disso-
nance were produced by when, where, and with whom on the mountain they thought 
about themselves in the framework of having experienced a self-discrepant act.
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Membership
The concept of membership refers to the competencies involved in being a bona 
fide member of a collective, especially in relation to language. This term refers to 
“capacities to speak, to know, to understand, to act in ways that are sensible in that 
society and in the situation in which people find themselves” (Have, 2004, p. 8). 
According to Garfinkel (1967), people embody the social competencies of the par-
ticular social groups that they belong to as these give them a sense of the surround-
ing social world. In the current study, both the climbers and myself demonstrated 
ourselves to be members of the subculture of high altitude mountaineering, and 
Mt. Everest mountaineering in particular. We embodied and exhibited the social 
competencies required of that group, and were thus recognized and accepted by the 
group as members. In this regard, climbing on the mountain with the participants 
throughout the duration of the expedition and submitting myself in their company 
to the daily challenges and struggles that they were subjected to, allowed me to 
gain an in-depth understanding of how they used the social competencies of the 
Mt. Everest culture to order their sense making activities of daily life in relation 
to their experiences with cognitive dissonance.
All six of the climbers’ experiences with cognitive dissonance provided oppor-
tunities to interpret and produce a shared understanding of daily life. Reconstructing 
their understanding of self-discrepant situations so that their self-concept mirrored 
their preformed notion of self helped create a collective understanding and sharing 
of their subcultural normative framework. For example, all of the climbers appeared 
to have socially organized risk-taking behaviors and prolonged physical discomfort 
as a commonplace activity by sharing, through their talk with others, their belief 
that climbing the mountain was a valuable and meaningful experience. Sayeed’s 
comment reflects this point:
I really want to do it. I want to do it because I am here and I have been here 
for a long time enduring so much shit. That is why I want to do it. It must be a 
massive teacher for anybody who gets to the top and suffers that much to get 
to that point. (Interview 2, Camp 2).
In this instance, enduring tremendous levels of discomfort was manifested in 
Sayeed’s interpretation of the outcome as being worthwhile and advantageous. To 
cope with the cognition that the environment was difficult and demanding, which 
conflicted with the cognition that they chose to endure it, all of the climbers shared a 
positive outlook surrounding the effort they expended to complete the task at hand. 
Gordie, who was finding the climb to be a lot harder than he had anticipated, stated: 
“I don’t care who you are. Anyone has got to feel really satisfied with reaching the 
summit because of the arduousness of it all.” (Interview 3, Base Camp). Similar 
views were expressed by Allan who in the early stages of the climb began expe-
riencing high levels of physical discomfort due to the effects of high altitude and 
the energy he expended on the mountain: “I think that anytime you put yourself in 
harm’s way or push yourself past your limits, you have to feel better about yourself 
as a person and climber.” (Interview 2, Camp 2). For both climbers, the return for 
their efforts was justified by experiencing positive self-directed feelings.
The ongoing interpretational processes relating to cognitive dissonance helped 
the climbers as members of the Mt. Everest culture to sustain their understanding 
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in relation to a shared stock of knowledge. Through specific forms of language and 
reasoning the climbers constructed and reconstructed their understanding of a situ-
ation based on the collective values of the culture of high altitude mountaineering. 
The conventional morals and prevailing values of the Mt. Everest culture created 
a negotiated reality and through its negotiations members produced a sense of an 
orderly and shared world (Garfinkel, 1967). The climbers used language in their 
interpretation of their behaviors allowing them to produce ongoing stories of specific 
behaviors within the context of particular situations. For example, after swearing 
at his expedition leader on the summit, Nate reconstructed the past to no longer 
feel like he acted childishly by focusing on the perceived irresponsible conduct 
of his leader. Interpreting the situation in this manner allowed him to reconstruct 
a sense that his expedition leader’s actions were outside the norm of acceptable 
behavior from the onset, thus producing a shared understanding of the reality of 
acceptable behavior.
Discussion
The traditional investigative approach used in cognitive dissonance studies has 
been limited to the confines of a laboratory using quantitative methodologies and 
has focused almost exclusively on the content of this experience. Adopting an 
ethnographic approach to explore how a group of Mt. Everest climbers operated as 
ethnomethodologists utilizing the principles of the documentary method of interpre-
tation, reflexivity, indexicality, and membership to make sense of their experiences 
of cognitive dissonance has opened an additional window on our understanding of 
this phenomenon. Immersion as a participant observer in the culture under study 
and climbing on the mountain with the participants to chart their lived experiences 
of cognitive dissonance, including their sense making processes, enabled the 
generation of rich data about this phenomenon within a natural context. Such data 
have the potential to lead toward a more complex understanding of the theory of 
cognitive dissonance in action by revealing the underlying processes involved in 
the manifestation and resolution of cognitive dissonance and how this experience 
is internalized in the subjective consciousness of participants.
By embracing the ethnographic tradition and combining it with questions 
framed by an ethnomethodological perspective, this study has enabled the taken-
for-granted processes underlying the cognitive dissonance experience of a small 
group of climbers to be made visible in a way that more typical cognitive disso-
nance measures are unable to accomplish. The findings may be incorporated into 
the original theory of cognitive dissonance as advocated by Festinger (1957), and 
Aronson’s (1968, 1992) development of this work through his self-consistency 
perspective, in ways that support and add to the theoretical processes suggested 
by these scholars. By focusing on how this phenomenon was actually produced by, 
and shared between climbers in their natural setting this study confirms Festinger’s 
(1957) original statement that if people hold two cognitions that are inconsistent 
they experience psychological discomfort and attempt to reduce it by changing 
one or more of the elements involved in dissonant relations so they are no longer 
inconsistent; adding new cognitive elements that are consonant with existing 
cognition to outweigh the dissonant beliefs, or; decreasing the importance of the 
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dissonant element(s). Our findings also support Aronson’s (1968, 1992) suggestion 
that the self-concept is at the core of the cognitive dissonance experience. That is, 
when the climbers behaved in ways that were inconsistent with their expectancies 
or beliefs about themselves dissonance resulted and attempts were made to reduce 
it through a process of self-justification.
An area of cognitive dissonance theory that has been underresearched is 
the identification of the precise methods that are involved in the organization of 
cognitive dissonance. Attempts by researchers to identify how the manifestation 
and resolution of cognitive dissonance is experienced at the microlevel of social 
interaction have been rare. By focusing on how the climbers drew on selected 
ethnomethodological principles to organize and make sense of their experiences 
with cognitive dissonance, this study provides much needed data for this under 
researched area. Furthermore, the findings make a significant contribution to the 
existing literature by revealing the dynamics of the cognitive dissonance process 
for the climbers with regard to the following: how cognitive dissonance involves 
a mutually elaborative process in which meaning is accomplished from within the 
interaction between a pattern of self-justification and self-inconsistencies; the ways 
in which the reflexive nature of cognitive dissonance is experienced; how specific 
features of the setting (i.e., time, space, place, etc.) are inextricably linked to the 
cognitive dissonance experience in a way that incorporates complex, local-specific 
meanings; and the ways in which people draw upon the shared stock of knowledge 
of the cultures to which they belong in making sense of their experiences with 
cognitive dissonance.
Given that this study provides a first qualitative glance at the cognitive disso-
nance experience from the perspective of high altitude mountaineers, the insights 
gained may be of practical value for sport psychologists and expedition leaders 
who are involved in fostering performance excellence by helping climbers learn 
how to prepare for, and deal with, challenges they may face on the mountain. 
Opening a window on where, when, and under what circumstances the climbers in 
this study experienced cognitive dissonance, may help sport psychologists better 
understand, for example, the types of situations that cause psychological distress 
for climbers both on and off the mountain. This study has shown that climbers are 
apt to experience psychological discomfort and engage in strategies to reduce or 
eliminate it when they make decisions that prevent them from reaching their goal. 
It is possible that performers in a wide variety of sporting domains experience this 
same psychological process when they act in ways that cause them to fall short 
of meeting their objectives. Furthermore, by investigating the ways in which the 
climbers reduced or eliminated their cognitive dissonance both on and off the 
mountain, this study has shed light on how this group coped with psychologically 
distressing situations including how they interpreted their reality when under psy-
chological duress. The insights gained may help sport psychologists increase their 
knowledge, for example, of how to help climbers and other performers implement 
strategies for dealing with their psychological discomfort and restoring a sense of 
psychological consistency.
Given the emphasis within ethnography on understanding the specific, local, 
and the particular, the potential applications of our findings to other performers and 
performance settings need to be balanced against a limitation of the study in terms of 
its generalizability. Clearly, ethnography does not set out to enumerate frequencies 
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and so cannot establish statistical generalizations. In contrast, by providing sufficient 
detail about the circumstances and context of the group of climbers in our study, 
via what Geertz (1983) called thick description, we hope the reader is able to make 
an informed judgment as to whether the findings are applicable and transferable 
to other cases and situations. Geertz also argued that the strength of ethnographic 
findings is in their complex specificness and their circumstantiality as these are the 
characteristics that make it possible to think “realistically and concretely about” 
social scientific concepts and theories and to “work creatively and imaginatively 
with them” (p. 23). Therefore, in terms of developing analytic generalizations from 
our study we invite other researchers to take our findings and use them as starting 
point for exploring the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance in other performance 
settings in creative and imaginative ways.
Future research might investigate the cognitive dissonance phenomenon with 
performers across the sporting spectrum to identify the conditions under which they 
are prone to experiencing its manifestation. Research is also required on how the 
resolution of cognitive dissonance affects outcomes and whether some strategies 
for resolving it are better suited than others for enhancing performance. Likewise, 
questions need to be addressed regarding differences between levels of climbing 
experience. In particular, it would be important to explore whether elite climbers 
experience cognitive dissonance in the same way and under the same circumstances 
as those who are less skilled. Questions remain regarding how cognitive dissonance 
is experienced by climbers from different cultures and from different social groups 
in terms of, for example, age, gender, social class, and ethnicity. There is also a 
need to better understand the temporal dimensions that appear to be involved in 
the cognitive dissonance experience of climbers.
Given that this article only presents qualitative data from a small group of high 
altitude mountaineers, the findings in relation to the cognitive dissonance experi-
ence remain tentative in nature. However, it is hoped that this study provides a 
starting point for further questions and investigation into the cognitive dissonance 
phenomenon utilizing an ethnographic approach and incorporating a variety of 
theoretical concepts from various disciplines.
References
Allen-Collinson, J., & Hockey, J. (2007). Public space and running together: Some eth-
nomethodological considerations. In F. Jordan, L. Kilgour, & N. Morgan (Eds.), Aca-
demic renewal: Innovation in leisure and tourism theories and methods (pp. 3–24). 
Brighton: LSA Publications. 
Aronson, E. (1968). Dissonance theory: Progress and problems. In R.P. Abelson, E. Aronson, 
W.J. McGuire, T.M. Newcomb, M.J. Rosenburg, & P.H. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories 
of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 5–27). Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Aronson, E. (1969). The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. In L. 
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 4, pp. 1–34). New 
York: Academic Press. 
Aronson, E. (1992). The return of the repressed: Dissonance theory makes a comeback. 
Psychological Inquiry, 3(4), 303–311. 
Aronson, E. (1999). Dissonance, hypocrisy, and the self-concept. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. 
Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology 
(pp. 103–126). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
354  Burke, Sparkes, and Allen-Collinson
Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(2), 177–181. 
Athearn, L. (2005). Further thoughts on climbing risks: Everest and the 8000-meter peaks 
in Nepal. The American Alpine News, 12, 10–12. 
Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., Lofland, J., & Lofland, L. (2001). Editorial introduc-
tion. In P. Atkinson, A. Coffey, S. Delamont, J. Lofland, & L. Lofland (Eds.), Handbook 
of ethnography (pp. 1–7). London: Sage. 
Bolin, A., & Granskog, J. (Eds.). (2003). Athletic intruders: Ethnographic research on women, 
culture, and exercise. New York: State University of New York Press. 
Brehm, J.W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52(3), 384–389. 
Coates, S. (1999). Analyzing the physical: An ethnomethodological study of boxing. Eth-
nographic Studies, 4, 14–26. 
Cooper, J. (1999). Unwanted consequences and the self: In search of the motivation for 
dissonance reduction. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: 
Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 103–126). Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
Coulon, A. (1995). Ethnomethodology. London: Sage. 
Creswell, J. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five tradi-
tions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Devine, P., Tauer, J., Barron, K., Elliot, A., & Vance, K. (1999). Moving beyond attitude 
change in the study of dissonance-related processes. In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills 
(Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 
297–323). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Garfinkel, H., & Sacks, H. (1970). On formal structures of practical actions. In J.C. McKin-
ney & E.A. Tiryahian (Eds.), Theoretical sociology: Perspectives and development (pp. 
337–366). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Faulkner, G., & Sparkes, A. (1999). Exercise as therapy for schizophrenia: An ethnographic 
study. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 21(1), 52–69. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Geertz, C. (1983). Local knowledge. New York: Basic Books. 
Handel, W. (1982). Ethnomethodology: How people make sense. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Hardyck, J.A., & Kardush, M. (1968). A modest modish model for dissonance reduction. 
In R.P. Abelson, E. Aronson, W.T. McGuire, T.M. Newcomb, M.J. Rosenberg, & P.H. 
Tannenbaum (Eds.), Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook (pp. 684–692). 
Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Harmon-Jones, E. (2000a). Cognitive dissonance and experienced negative affect: Evidence 
that dissonance increases experienced negative affect even in the absence of aversive 
consequences. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(12), 1490–1501. 
Have, P. (2004). Understanding qualitative research and ethnomethodology. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Holt, N., & Sparkes, A. (2001). An ethnographic study of cohesiveness in a college soccer 
team over a season. The Sport Psychologist, 15(3), 237–259. 
Jorgenson, D. (1989). Participant observation. London: Sage. 
Krane, V., & Baird, M. (2005). Using ethnography in applied sport psychology. Journal of 
Applied Sport Psychology, 17(2), 87–107. 
Lynch, M., & Peyrot, M. (1992). Introduction: A reader’s guide to ethnomethodology. 
Qualitative Sociology, 15(2), 113–122. 
Sands, R. (2002). Sport ethnography. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. 
Climbers as Ethnomethodologists  355
Sparkes, A. (2002). Telling tales in sport and physical activity. Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics. 
Sparkes, A. (2005). Narrative analysis: Exploring the whats and hows of personal stories. In 
M. Holloway (Ed.). Qualitative Research in Health Care (pp. 91-209). Milton Keynes, 
UK: Open University Press. 
Sparkes, A., Partington, E., & Brown, D. (2007). Bodies as bearers of value: The transmis-
sion of jock culture via the ‘Twelve Commandments.’. Sport Education and Society, 
12(3), 295–316. 
Steele, C. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In 
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21, pp. 261–302). 
San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Swandt, T. (1997). Qualitative inquiry. London: Sage. 
Thibodeau, R., & Aronson, E. (1992). Taking a closer look: Reasserting the role of the 
self-concept in dissonance theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(5), 
591–602. 
Wheaton, B. (Ed.). (2004). Understanding lifestyle sports: Consumption, identity, and dif-
ference. London: Routledge.

